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Abstract:  
This paper considers a pharmaceutical supply chain composed of one pharmaceutical 
manufacturer and one pharmacy. We investigate how price cap regulation affects 
pharmaceutical firms’ pricing decisions. We also evaluate the economic and social performance 
of the pharmaceutical supply chain and assess the risks associated with price cap regulation. 
The derived equilibriums under different price cap regulations, including retailer price cap 
regulation, manufacturer price cap regulation and linkage price cap regulation, are compared to 
that without regulation. Our results show that one-sided price cap regulation will damage the 
economic performance of the regulated firm, whereas the unregulated firm may gain a financial 
advantage. The regulation may increase the risk of a supply shortage if pharmaceutical firms 
cannot cope with the financial loss. In contrast, linkage price cap regulation can be an effective 
policy for improving both the economic and social performance of the pharmaceutical supply 
chain. 
 
Keywords: pharmaceutical supply chain; regulation risk; price cap regulation; pricing. 
 
 
  
  2 
1 Introduction 
The pharmaceutical industry plays an important role in the economy, society, and public health 
in almost every country in the world. The pricing of pharmaceutical products is a vital and 
contentious issue for both developed and developing countries (Danzon et al., 2015a, 2015b). 
For middle- and low-income countries, effective pricing of pharmaceuticals is critical to the 
accessibility and affordability of medicines and the population’s social welfare. For example, 
despite the rapid economic development in China, the high price of drugs has continuously been 
blamed for unaffordable healthcare service for less-advantaged people, which has triggered 
increasing complaints from the public (Yu et al., 2010). For developed countries, although the 
affordability of drugs may not be a challenge to their citizens due to extensive medical 
insurance, high drug prices have certainly increased the burden of government public 
expenditures.  
      In the context of a significant increase in pharmaceutical expenditures during the two last 
decades, there has been growing interest from governments in controlling the price of 
pharmaceutical products (Bardey et al., 2010; Troyer and Krasnikov, 2011). Many governments 
frequently consider regulatory mechanisms, e.g., price cap regulation and reference pricing, to 
prevent pharmaceutical firms from charging high drug prices and protect their citizens from 
paying too much. Whereas price caps are often used to limit pharmaceutical firms’ ability to 
exploit their market power by charging high prices, reference pricing aims at stimulating market 
competition by introducing more price elastic demand (Brekke et al., 2007; 2009). For instance, 
most Europe Union nations set caps on the consumer price of generic drugs and/or regulate the 
maximum reimbursement rate, whereas an intervention through price regulation seems to be 
less necessary in the drug market according to economic theory (Puig-Junoy, 2010). In China, 
pricing and reimbursement are important aspects of pharmaceutical policy that have been 
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included in the central government’s large-scale healthcare reform launched in April 2009 
(Chen, 2009; Hu and Mossialos, 2016).  
      The Chinese government has set price caps on different pharmaceutical products in 
response to soaring drug prices (Hu and Mossialos, 2016). Unfortunately, evidence emerging 
from recent research (Han et al., 2013; Wu et al., 2015; Yang et al., 2016) indicates that the 
price cap policies were ineffective and resulted in some unintended consequences. The media 
reported that there were shortages of thousands of drugs in pharmacies in Guangdong Province 
of China. This was echoed by Zhang et al. (2016), who claimed that the reduction of the price 
cap level is associated with a higher incidence of pharmaceutical firms’ exit from markets. The 
introduction of new industry regulations could have a profound impact on firms’ performance 
(Pugliese et al. 2014) and contribute to business failure (Amankwah-Amoah 2016). Regulators 
have to be conscious of the unintended consequence of a continuous reduction of the price cap 
level. A thoughtful design of drug pricing regulation and risk evaluation of price cap policies 
are essential to minimizing the risk of policy failure.  
      The existing literature mainly examines pricing regulations from the perspective of macro 
health economics (Håkonsen et al., 2009; Danzon et al., 2015a,b; Hu and Mossialos, 2016), 
whereas little attention has been paid to the evaluation of pharmaceutical pricing regulations 
considering how pharmaceutical firms and supply chains will behave under the regulations and 
how their behavior impacts the social and economic performance of the sector. By contrast, 
previous studies in the operation and supply chain literature on pharmaceutical products often 
focus on optimizing operations/supply chain decisions under different regulatory policies (Yu 
et al., 2010). Companies often respond to regulatory policies strategically and operationally to 
maximize their benefits. Therefore, when policy makers consider the development of new 
regulations, it is valuable for regulators to understand how firms will react to new regulations 
and the consequential economic and social performance. To address this gap in the literature, 
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some key questions are discussed considering price cap regulation for the pharmaceutical 
supply chain. 
(1) What are the optimal pricing decisions of the pharmaceutical manufacturer and 
pharmacy under price cap regulation?  
(2) How can the government develop appropriate price cap regulation to improve social 
welfare and economic sustainability and mitigate the risk of policy failure? 
(3) What are the key parameters of price cap regulation to achieve the coordination of the 
pharmaceutical supply chain? 
To address the above questions, this research mainly focuses on price cap regulation and 
examines how the regulations affect the pharmaceutical firms’ operational decisions and the 
consequential economic and social performance. This paper investigates a two-echelon 
pharmaceutical supply chain composed of one pharmaceutical manufacturer and one pharmacy. 
The pharmaceutical manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader, and the pharmacy is the follower. 
We not only consider retailer price cap regulation and manufacturer price cap regulation, which 
are often adopted by governments, but also propose a linkage price cap regulation where the 
whole pharmaceutical supply chain is regulated. Through a comparison of optimal prices, 
profits and social welfare between the scenarios with and without regulations, we analyze the 
effect of each regulatory policy. In this way, we aim to solve the problem of selecting an optimal 
regulation and examine the supply chain coordination.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant research streams. 
The models and equilibrium analysis are provided in Section 3. Based on the model formulation 
and assumptions, we use the model with no price cap regulation as a base model and then 
propose a retailer price cap regulation model, manufacturer price cap regulation model, and 
linkage price cap regulation model. In Section 4, the effects of alternative price cap regulations 
on the equilibriums and profits of the pharmacy and pharmaceutical manufacturer are discussed. 
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In Section 5, we further discuss pharmaceutical supply chain coordination under the optimally 
designed price cap regulation. Finally, the main conclusions and future extensions are 
highlighted in Section 6. 
 
2 Literature Review 
To provide the research background and highlight our contributions, we mainly review two 
relevant research streams: (i) the effect of price cap regulation on pharmaceutical pricing and 
(ii) the effect of regulation on the operational decisions of the pharmaceutical supply chain. 
      A substantial body of literature has examined price cap regulation in the pharmaceutical 
industry. Abbott (1995) is one of the early studies. The simulation study finds that launch prices 
are often optimally set 50% higher by pharmaceutical firms than that in an unregulated market. 
Ekelund and Persson (2003) compare how new pharmaceuticals are priced in the U.S. market 
with those in the price-regulated Swedish market, and their findings indicate that price 
competition between drugs with brand names is discouraged by price regulation. Brekke et al. 
(2009) examine the relationship between pharmaceutical firms’ pricing strategies and 
regulatory regimes using a reference price system called “index pricing” introduced in Norway 
in 2003. Their findings indicate that reference pricing is more effective than price cap regulation 
at lowering drug prices, while patient protection is a concern because of the cross-price effect. 
Through a comprehensive review of the impact of price cap regulation of generic medicines in 
Europe, Puig-Junoy (2010) indicates that although the application of price regulations leads to 
price reductions, they also create barriers to dynamic market competition in consumer prices. 
Consumers and insurers may not benefit from these regulations. In fact, there are also risks 
associated with price cap regulations. For instance, in an empirical study on the relationship 
between drug shortages and the retail price control policy introduced by the Chinese 
government, Liu (2007) finds that the policy widened the gap between the supply and market 
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demand of those drugs over the 10-year period. Zhang et al. (2016) investigate the effect of 
price cap regulations on the exit of generic pharmaceutical firms, and their findings show that 
reducing the price cap level is associated with a higher incidence of pharmaceutical firms 
exiting from markets. Although most of the abovementioned studies focus on the effects of 
price cap regulation in the pharmaceutical industry, there have been very limited attempts to 
explain why the implementation of price cap regulations are not successful and how the policy 
results in unintended consequences, such as drug shortages (Liu, 2007) and subdued R&D 
investment (Troyer and Krasnikov, 2011). Our research aims to provide some insights into this 
research problem.   
      The pharmaceutical supply chain has drawn substantial interest from business and 
management research, which is demonstrated by some recent published literature reviews 
(Dobrzykowski et al., 2014; Narayana et al., 2014; Settanni et al., 2017). The pharmaceutical 
industry is characterized by a high cost of R&D and innovation (Morgan et al., 2011; DiMasi 
et al., 2016), complexity in the supply and distribution of pharmaceutical products in both 
developed (Rossetti et al., 2011) and developing countries (Prado et al., 2016), and supply-side 
market power (Brekke et al., 2007; Rossetti et al., 2011). For instance, Selva (2016) investigates 
a supply management system to choose suppliers, make purchasing policies and manage 
inventory in the healthcare industry of Latin America. There are also significant differences 
between the developed countries in Europe and America, with their well-developed healthcare 
systems and pharmaceutical markets, and the developing countries in Africa and Asia, with 
concerns on the demand side and inefficiencies downstream on the supply side (Narayana et 
al., 2014). Furthermore, the competitive and operational environment of the pharmaceutical 
supply chain is constantly sharpened by on-going macro-economic and regulatory events 
(Rossetti et al., 2011). Supply chain managers have to take these into consideration when 
making strategic and tactical decisions. In a recent study, Zhao et al. (2012) take fee-for-service 
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(FFS) and investment buying (IB) contracts into account to solve the multi-period stochastic 
inventory problems for the pharmaceutical supply chain. To analyze the impact of the restriction 
policies, e.g., the Physician Payment Sunshine Act, Liu et al. (2015) create a structural model 
of how pharmaceutical firms compete dynamically to schedule detailing to physicians and 
discuss the policy implications. Raventós and Zolezzi (2015) conduct an empirical study and 
find that an electronic tendering policy could create a greater than 8% price reduction for 
pharmaceuticals and medical devices in Chile. Although there are a growing number of studies 
focusing on various aspects of the pharmaceutical supply chain, including supply network 
design (Danese et al., 2006; Nagurney et al. 2013; Mousazadeh et al., 2015), e-business 
implementation (Cullen and Taylor, 2009; Bhakoo and Chan, 2011), risk (Bhattacharya et al. 
2014; Elleuch et al. 2014) and sustainability (Xie and Breen, 2012; Uthayakumar and Priyan 
2013), to the best of our knowledge, little attention has been paid to how pharmaceutical firms 
behave under price cap regulation and how their operational decisions are made in responding 
to the policy impact the economic and social performance of the pharmaceutical supply chain. 
Our research aims to address this research gap and examine the alternative options of price cap 
regulation through modeling the pharmaceutical supply chain’s decision behavior and 
evaluating the consequential economic and social performance. 
 
3 The models and equilibrium analysis 
3.1 Module formulation and assumption  
We consider a two-echelon pharmaceutical supply chain composed of one pharmaceutical 
manufacturer and one pharmacy. The pharmacy purchases drugs from the pharmaceutical 
manufacturer and then sells them to patients. We assume that the pharmaceutical manufacturer 
is the Stackelberg leader and that the pharmacy is the Stackelberg follower. This is common in 
the supply chain literature and in practice (Luo et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2017). For instance, 
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Johnson & Johnson, one of the largest pharmaceutical manufacturing companies, usually takes 
a leadership position in its interaction with upstream suppliers or downstream pharmacies 
(Kathryn, 2016; Johnson & Johnson, 2017). In addition, we define some parameters and 
variables as summarized in Table 1.  
Table 1 Notations 
Notation Descriptions 
𝑐 Pharmaceutical manufacturer’s unit production cost. 
𝑤 Pharmaceutical manufacturer’s unit wholesale price.  
𝑝 Pharmacy’s unit retail price, 𝑝 > 𝑤 > 𝑐. 
𝐷 Demand faced by the pharmacy. 
?̅? Retail price cap imposed by the government. 
?̅? Wholesale price cap imposed by the government. 
𝜃 
Linkage coefficient between the wholesale price cap and the retail price cap under the 
linkage price cap regulation, 0 < 𝜃 < 1. 
𝜋𝑚(𝑤) Pharmaceutical manufacturer’s profit. 
𝜋𝑟(𝑝) Pharmacy’s profit. 
𝜋𝑠 Total profit of the pharmaceutical supply chain, 𝜋𝑠 = 𝜋𝑚(𝑤) + 𝜋𝑟(𝑝). 
𝐶𝑠 Patient surplus.  
𝑊𝑠 Social welfare.  
 
 
In alignment with prior studies in operations management (Lee and Staelin, 1997; Yalabik 
and Fairchild, 2011; Chen et al., 2016), the demand curve is given as a function of price and 
denoted by 𝐷 = 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝, where 𝛼 is the primary market base and 𝛽 is the self-price sensitivity, 
with 𝛽 > 0. Based on the above demand function, the pharmaceutical manufacturer’s profit 
𝜋𝑚(𝑤) is: 
𝜋𝑚(𝑤) = 𝑤(𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝) − 𝑐(𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝).                                       (1) 
The first part of the formula represents the revenue from drug wholesaling, and the second 
part corresponds to the manufacturer’s production cost.  
The pharmacy’s profit 𝜋𝑟(𝑝) is: 
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𝜋𝑟(𝑝) = 𝑝(𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝) − 𝑤(𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝).                                       (2) 
The first part of the formula represents the revenue from drug retail sales, and the second 
part corresponds to the purchasing cost. 
Social welfare consists of the patient surplus, the pharmaceutical manufacturer’s profit and 
the pharmacy’s profit (Baron and Myerson, 1982; Feng et al., 2017). Referring to the previous 
literature (Cowan, 1998; Jin et al., 2015), the patient surplus is 𝐶𝑠 = ∫ (𝛼 − 𝛽𝑥) ⅆ𝑥
𝛼
𝛽
𝑝
. Then, 
social welfare is 𝑊𝑠 = 𝐶𝑠 + 𝜋𝑚(𝑤) + 𝜋𝑟(𝑝). 
3.2 The models  
First, we propose a base model without price cap regulation (NPCR) and investigate the pricing 
decisions. The pharmacy’s decision problem for the NPCR model is: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑝
𝜋𝑟(𝑝) 
The pharmaceutical manufacturer’s decision problem for the NPCR model is: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑤
𝜋𝑚(𝑤) 
For the retailer price cap regulation (RPCR) model, the government regulates only the 
downstream pharmacy via limiting the maximum price (price cap ?̅?) paid by the patient (Puig-
Junoy, 2010). That means that the pharmacy must decide its retail price with the constraint 𝑝 ≤
?̅?. Then, the pharmacy’s decision problem for the RPCR model is: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑝
𝜋𝑟(𝑝) 
𝑠. 𝑡.   𝑝 ≤ ?̅? 
The pharmaceutical manufacturer’s decision problem for the RPCR model is: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑤
𝜋𝑚(𝑤) 
For the manufacturer price cap regulation (MPCR) model, we consider that the government 
regulates only the upstream pharmaceutical manufacturer by setting a wholesale price cap. That 
means that the manufacturer must decide his wholesale price with the constraint 𝑤 ≤ ?̅?. 
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The pharmacy’s decision problem for the MPCR model is: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑝
𝜋𝑟(𝑝) 
The pharmaceutical manufacturer’s decision problem for the MPCR model is: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑤
𝜋𝑚(𝑤) 
𝑠. 𝑡.   𝑤 ≤ ?̅? 
IV. Linkage price cap regulation model 
First, we propose a linkage price cap regulation (LPCR) by assuming that ?̅? is the 𝜃 proportion 
of the retail price cap ?̅? and ?̅? = 𝜃?̅?, where ?̅? represents the retail price cap that regulates the 
downstream pharmacy’s pricing decision, that is, 𝑝 ≤ ?̅?; ?̅? represents the wholesale price cap 
that regulates the upstream pharmaceutical manufacturer’s pricing decision, namely 𝑤 ≤ ?̅?; 
and 𝜃 is the linkage coefficient to keep a connection between the two price caps. Hence, instead 
of regulating part of the pharmaceutical supply chain, the linkage price cap regulation aims to 
regulate the whole pharmaceutical supply chain. Next, we investigate each pharmaceutical 
firm’s pricing decisions for the LPCR model.  
The pharmacy’s decision problem for the LPCR model is: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑝
𝜋𝑟(𝑝) 
𝑠. 𝑡.   𝑝 ≤ ?̅? 
The pharmaceutical manufacturer’s decision problem for the LPCR model is: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑤
𝜋𝑚(𝑤) 
𝑠. 𝑡.   𝑤 ≤ 𝜃?̅? 
Furthermore, we can derive the optimal retail price (𝑝𝑖) of the pharmacy and the optimal 
wholesale price (𝑤𝑖) of the pharmaceutical manufacturer for the NPCR, RPCR, MPCR and 
LPCR models (𝑖 = 𝑛, 𝑟, 𝑚, 𝑠), which is shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2 Optimal solutions for the four models 
Models 𝒑𝒊 𝒘𝒊 
NPCR model  
(𝑖 = 𝑛) 
3𝛼 + 𝑐𝛽
4𝛽
 
𝛼 + 𝑐𝛽
2𝛽
 
RPCR model (𝑖 = 𝑟) 
?̅? ≥ 𝑝𝑛 
3𝛼 + 𝑐𝛽
4𝛽
 
𝛼 + 𝑐𝛽
2𝛽
 
?̅? < 𝑝𝑛 ?̅? ?̅? 
MPCR model (𝑖 = 𝑚) 
?̅? ≥ 𝑤𝑛 
3𝛼 + 𝑐𝛽
4𝛽
 
𝛼 + 𝑐𝛽
2𝛽
 
?̅? < 𝑤𝑛 
𝛼 + 𝛽?̅?
2𝛽
 ?̅? 
LPCR model (𝑖 = 𝑠) 
?̅? ≥ 𝑝𝑛 and ?̅? ≥ 𝑤𝑛 
3𝛼 + 𝑐𝛽
4𝛽
 
𝛼 + 𝑐𝛽
2𝛽
 
?̅? ≥ 𝑝𝑛 and ?̅? < 𝑤𝑛 
𝛼 + 𝛽𝜃?̅?
2𝛽
 𝜃?̅? 
?̅? < 𝑝𝑛 and ?̅? ≥ 𝑤𝑛 ?̅? ?̅? 
?̅? < 𝑝𝑛 and ?̅? < 𝑤𝑛 ?̅? 𝜃?̅? 
 
 
4 Evaluation of price cap regulations 
In this section, we study the effect of price cap regulation on the prices and profits of the 
pharmacy and pharmaceutical manufacturer via comparing the optimal pricing decisions and 
profits for the different price cap regulation models developed in Section 3. In this way, we aim 
to explore how each price cap regulation affects the firms’ pricing decisions, the patient surplus 
and social welfare, and whether and how each price cap regulation can benefit pharmaceutical 
firms. The results may shed light on how to develop an effective price cap regulation for policy 
makers.  
4.1 Effect of RPCR on decisions and performance 
First, by examining relevant equilibriums in Table 2, we obtain the effect of the retail price cap, 
?̅?, on the optimal retail and wholesale prices, the patient surplus and social welfare. Therefore, 
we propose the following: 
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Lemma 1: For the RPCR model, (1) i) if ?̅? ≥ 𝒑𝒏, then 𝒑𝒓 = 𝒑𝒏 and 𝒘𝒓 = 𝒘𝒏. ii) If ?̅? <
𝒑𝒏, then 𝒑𝒓 < 𝒑𝒏. If 𝒘𝒏 < ?̅? < 𝒑𝒏, then 𝒘𝒓 > 𝒘𝒏; if ?̅? < 𝒘𝒏, then 𝒘𝒓 < 𝒘𝒏. 
(2) If ?̅? ≥ 𝒑𝒏 , then 𝑾𝒔
𝒓  and 𝑪𝒔
𝒓  are independent on ?̅?; if ?̅? < 𝒑𝒏 , then 𝑾𝒔
𝒓  and 𝑪𝒔
𝒓 
decrease in ?̅?. 
Part (1) of this lemma means that if the retail price cap is higher than the optimal 
unregulated retail price (?̅? ≥ 𝑝𝑛), the optimal retail and wholesale prices will equal those for 
the NPCR model. That is, the price cap regulation has no effect on the prices in this case. If the 
price cap is lower than the optimal unregulated retail price (?̅? < 𝑝𝑛), the optimal retail price 
will equal the price cap, which is lower than that for the NPCR model. Meanwhile, if the retail 
price cap is also higher than the optimal unregulated wholesale price (?̅? > 𝑤𝑛), the optimal 
wholesale price will increase under the regulation. This can be explained by the fact that a cap 
on the retail price results in a stationary customer demand. Any decrease in the wholesale price 
from the manufacturer will not influence the demand of end consumers. Therefore, the 
manufacturer will charge a higher wholesale price to maximize its own profits. In contrast, if 
the retail price cap is lower than the value of the optimal unregulated wholesale price, the 
wholesale price under the regulation will be lower accordingly.  
From part (2) of this lemma, if the retail price cap ?̅? exceeds the optimal retail price for 
the NPCR model (?̅? ≥ 𝑝𝑛), price cap regulation has no effect on the patient surplus and social 
welfare. If the price cap is lower (?̅? < 𝑝𝑛), the regulation can always increase the patient surplus 
and social welfare. Such an impact will be magnified with a lower price cap. 
Second, we investigate the regulation effect on the profits of the pharmacy and 
pharmaceutical manufacturer for the RPCR model. Since the price cap has no impact when the 
price cap is high (?̅? ≥ 𝑝𝑛), as illustrated in Lemma 1, here we mainly focus on the situation 
where there is a low retail price cap, ?̅? < 𝑝𝑛. We obtain the following: 
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Proposition 1: For the RPCR model, 𝝅𝒓(𝒑
𝒓) < 𝝅𝒓(𝒑
𝒏). If ?̅? <
𝜶+𝒄𝜷
𝟐𝜷
−
√𝟐(𝜶−𝒄𝜷)
𝟒𝜷
, then 
𝝅𝒎(𝒘
𝒓) < 𝝅𝒎(𝒘
𝒏); if ?̅? >
𝜶+𝒄𝜷
𝟐𝜷
−
√𝟐(𝜶−𝒄𝜷)
𝟒𝜷
, then 𝝅𝒎(𝒘
𝒓) > 𝝅𝒎(𝒘
𝒏). 
This proposition shows that under the retailer price cap regulation, the pharmacy’s profit 
is always lower than that without regulation. For the pharmaceutical manufacturer, when the 
price cap is lower than one threshold (?̅? <
𝛼+𝑐𝛽
2𝛽
−
√2(𝛼−𝑐𝛽)
4𝛽
), its profit under the regulation will 
decrease. In contrast, when the price cap is higher than this threshold, the manufacturer will be 
better off. The reason is that a lower price cap induces not only a lower wholesale price but also 
higher demands. When the loss from a decreased marginal profit exceeds the benefit of the 
increased demands, the profit will be lower under the retail price cap regulation. Conversely, 
when the benefit of increased demands can compensate for the losses from a decreased profit 
margin, the retail price cap regulation can lead to an increase in profit for the manufacturer. 
Based on the findings of Lemma 1 and Proposition 1, it is clear that a high cap on the retail 
price will have no impact on pharmaceutical firms’ pricing decisions and the economic and 
social performance of the pharmaceutical supply chain. In contrast, a low cap, on the one hand, 
will improve the social welfare of patients. In this case, the price cap policy can protect the 
patient from a high price of pharmaceutical products. In addition, this policy can also be 
conducive to increasing the total social welfare. However, on the other hand, a low cap will 
certainly have a negative impact on the pharmacy’s economic performance. Depending on the 
value of the cap, it may benefit or harm the pharmaceutical manufacturer’s economic 
performance. Since the pharmaceutical manufacturer can benefit from a relatively high cap, he 
can offer a profit sharing contract to the pharmacy to persuade him to sell the regulated drugs 
and achieve a win-win outcome. However, if the retail price cap is very low, the negative 
economic impact on the pharmacy and pharmaceutical manufacturer will be severe. It will 
increase the risk of drug shortage because there is less incentive for the pharmacy and the 
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manufacturer to sell and supply those price-regulated drugs. Therefore, policy makers should 
be careful in setting the cap when implementing retail price cap regulation. Other supporting 
policies, such as giving the pharmacy and manufacturer subsidies, may be considered if the 
drug prices are reduced significantly because of retail price cap regulation.  
4.2 Effect of MPCR on decisions and performance 
Now, we examine the effect of the wholesale price cap on the pricing decisions and profits of 
the pharmacy and pharmaceutical manufacturer for the MPCR model. Similar to the RPCR 
model, we first propose Lemma 2 regarding the effect of the wholesale price cap, ?̅?, on the 
optimal retail and wholesale prices, the patient surplus and social welfare. 
Lemma 2: For the MPCR model, (1) if ?̅? ≥ 𝒘𝒏, then 𝒑𝒎 = 𝒑𝒏 and 𝒘𝒎 = 𝒘𝒏. If ?̅? <
𝒘𝒏, then 𝒑𝒎 < 𝒑𝒏 and 𝒘𝒎 < 𝒘𝒏. (2) If ?̅? ≥ 𝒘𝒏, then 𝑾𝒔
𝒎 and 𝑪𝒔
𝒎 are independent on ?̅?; 
if ?̅? < 𝒘𝒏, then 𝑾𝒔
𝒎 and 𝑪𝒔
𝒎 decrease in ?̅?. 
This lemma generates similar results compared to Lemma 1. From part (1) of Lemma 2, if 
the wholesale price cap ?̅? is higher than the optimal wholesale price for the NPCR model (?̅? ≥
𝑤𝑛), the optimal retail price and wholesale price will be equal to those for the NPCR model, 
respectively. If the wholesale price cap ?̅? is lower than the unregulated wholesale price (?̅? <
𝑤𝑛), both the retail and wholesale prices will be lower than those without price cap regulation.  
Part (2) of Lemma 2 implies that if the wholesale price cap ?̅? is higher (?̅? ≥ 𝑤𝑛) than the 
optimal wholesale price for the NPCR model, the price cap regulation will have no effect on 
the patient surplus and social welfare. If the wholesale price cap ?̅? is lower than the unregulated 
wholesale price (?̅? < 𝑤𝑛), then a low cap on wholesale price will increase both the patient 
surplus and social welfare. 
Second, we discuss the regulation effect on the profits. Similar to the RPCR model, we 
primarily focus on the condition ?̅? < 𝑤𝑛 where the regulation has effects on pricing decisions. 
The results are shown in the following proposition. 
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Proposition 2: For the MPCR model, 𝝅𝒓(𝒑
𝒎) > 𝝅𝒓(𝒑
𝒏), 𝝅𝒎(𝒘
𝒎) < 𝝅𝒎(𝒘
𝒏). 
This proposition indicates that under the manufacturer price cap regulation, the 
pharmacy’s profit will increase; however, the regulated pharmaceutical manufacturer’s profit 
will always decrease. Therefore, the manufacturer is worse off under the wholesale price cap 
regulation. Based on the findings of Lemma 2 and Proposition 2, it is clear that a cap on the 
wholesale price can have a positive impact on the pharmacy’s economic benefit and the social 
performance of the pharmaceutical supply chain but harm the profit margin of the 
pharmaceutical manufacturer. Therefore, the manufacturer price cap regulation will be 
welcomed by the patient due to lower drug prices. However, it will reduce the incentives for 
the manufacturer to supply these regulated drugs. More seriously, if the manufacturer cannot 
bear the loss imposed by the price cap regulation, there is a risk of supply shortage for the 
regulated drugs. Thus, to avoid the shortage, the pharmacy may compensate the manufacturer 
by distributing part of his increased profit to the manufacturer to ensure the supply of drugs. 
From the policy makers’ perspective, they must take the drug shortage risk into consideration 
and come up with additional policies to mitigate the risk before implementing the manufacturer 
price cap regulation.  
4.3 Effect of LPCR on decisions and performance 
In this subsection, we discuss the regulatory effect on the pharmacy’s and the pharmaceutical 
manufacturer’s prices and profits for the LPCR model. First, we explore the effects of the retail 
price cap, ?̅?, and the wholesale price cap, ?̅? , on the optimal pricing decisions, the patient 
surplus and social welfare, which is shown in Lemma 3. 
Lemma 3: For the LPCR model, (1) i) if  ?̅? ≥ 𝒑𝒏 and ?̅? ≥ 𝒘𝒏, then 𝒑𝒔 = 𝒑𝒏 and 𝒘𝒔 =
𝒘𝒏. ii) If ?̅? < 𝒑𝒏  and ?̅? ≥ 𝒘𝒏, then 𝒑𝒔 < 𝒑𝒏 and 𝒘𝒔 > 𝒘𝒏. iii) If ?̅? < 𝒘𝒏, then 𝒑𝒔 < 𝒑𝒏 
and 𝒘𝒔 < 𝒘𝒏. 
  16 
(2) If ?̅? ≥ 𝒑𝒏 and ?̅? ≥ 𝒘𝒏, then 𝑾𝒔
𝒔 and 𝑪𝒔
𝒔 are independent on ?̅?; otherwise, 𝑾𝒔
𝒔 and 
𝑪𝒔
𝒔 decrease in ?̅?. 
Similar to the results for the RPCR and MPCR models, part (1) depicts that when both the 
retail price cap and wholesale price cap are respectively higher than those for the NPCR model, 
the optimal pricing decisions will be the same as those for the NPCR model. Therefore, the 
regulation does not make any impact. Otherwise, the linkage price cap regulation with lower 
caps can have a knock-on effect on the pricing decisions. At this time, the optimal retail price 
will always be lower than that without regulation. However, for the manufacturer, its optimal 
wholesale price may be higher or lower than that without regulation, which depends on whether 
the wholesale price cap is higher or lower than that for the NPCR model.  
Part (2) of Lemma 3 indicates that if the retail and wholesale price caps are higher than the 
optimal unregulated retail price and wholesale price, respectively, the regulation will not have 
any impact on the patient surplus and social welfare. Otherwise, the lower the retail price cap 
is, the better the patient surplus and social welfare. 
Second, as to the effects on the firms’ profits, our analysis mainly focuses on the condition 
where the regulation has impacts on the retail and wholesale prices. That is, 1) ?̅? ≥ 𝑝𝑛 and ?̅? <
𝑤𝑛 ; 2) ?̅? < 𝑝𝑛  and ?̅? ≥ 𝑤𝑛 ; and 3) ?̅? < 𝑝𝑛  and ?̅? < 𝑤𝑛  in Table 2. We can obtain some 
interesting results as shown in the following proposition. 
Proposition 3: If 
𝜶+𝟑𝒄𝜷
𝟒𝜷
< ?̅? ≤
𝟑𝜶+𝒄𝜷
𝟒𝜷
 and 𝜽𝟏 < 𝜃 < 𝜽𝟎 , then 𝝅𝒓(𝒑
𝒔) > 𝝅𝒓(𝒑
𝒏)  and 
𝝅𝒎(𝒘
𝒔) > 𝝅𝒎(𝒘
𝒏), where 𝜽𝟎 =
𝟏𝟔𝜷?̅?(𝜶−𝜷?̅?)−(𝜶−𝒄𝜷)𝟐
𝟏𝟔𝜷?̅?(𝜶−𝜷?̅?)
 and 𝜽𝟏 =
𝜶𝟐+𝟔𝒄𝜶𝜷+𝒄𝟐𝜷𝟐−𝟖𝒄𝜷𝟐?̅?
𝟖𝜷?̅?(𝜶−𝜷?̅?)
. 
This proposition means that under the linkage price cap regulation, the profits of the 
pharmacy and pharmaceutical manufacturer can increase. As illustrated in the following Figure 
1, a Pareto zone exists that is defined by the values of the retail price cap (?̅?) and the linkage 
coefficient (𝜃) and is marked with the shaded area. The curve below the Pareto zone (𝜃1) depicts 
that the manufacturer can be better off than that for the NPCR model and achieve Pareto 
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improvement. The curve above the Pareto zone (𝜃0) means that the pharmacy can earn more 
profits and achieve Pareto improvement. In the Pareto zone, both the pharmacy and 
manufacturer can gain increased profit and achieve Pareto improvement. Thus, an appropriate 
designed linkage price cap regulation will balance the retail and wholesale prices of regulated 
drugs via adjusting the retail price cap and linkage coefficient. Compared to one-sided price 
cap regulation, it not only protects the pharmacy’s economic performance from the retail price 
cap but also avoids the manufacturer being hurt from the wholesale price cap. As a result, the 
risk of drug shortage and market exit for either the pharmacy or the pharmaceutical 
manufacturer can be mitigated. Recalling Lemma 3, the linkage price cap can also increase the 
patient surplus and social welfare. Thus, for policy makers, linkage price cap regulation can be 
easily implemented without adverse effect. Pharmaceutical firms can make pricing decisions to 
maximize their own profit and do not need to negotiate to distribute the increased profit, like 
retailer price cap regulation or manufacturer price cap regulation. It is also beneficial to the 
patient since the drug prices also decrease. In a word, an optimally design linkage price cap 
regulation can be an effective regulation for improving the economic and social performance 
of the pharmaceutical supply chain simultaneously. 
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5 Coordination of the pharmaceutical supply chain  
In this section, we discuss whether the pharmaceutical supply chain can achieve coordination 
under price cap regulation through an optimal design of the price cap. According to the analysis 
in Section 4, neither retailer price cap regulation nor manufacturer price cap regulation can 
improve the economic performance of the pharmacy and manufacturer. In contrast, under 
linkage price cap regulation, the retail price cap and linkage coefficient can be optimally 
designed to make both the pharmacy and manufacturer achieve Pareto improvement. Therefore, 
we focus on analyzing whether the pharmaceutical supply chain can achieve coordination under 
the Pareto improvement conditions. 
First, we investigate the optimal retail price of the integrated pharmaceutical supply chain 
under no price cap regulation. The following lemma can be obtained. 
Lemma 4: For the integrated supply chain model, 𝒑𝑰 =
𝜶+𝒄𝜷
𝟐𝜷
. 
Compared to the decentralized pharmaceutical supply chain without regulation, the 
integrated supply chain charges a lower retail price yet gains more profit. This is because the 
manufacturer and pharmacy make their decisions separately to maximize their own profit in the 
decentralized supply chain, which causes double marginalization.  
To alleviate double marginalization and achieve supply chain coordination under the 
Pareto improvement conditions proposed in the linkage price cap regulation model, we obtain 
the following proposition. 
Proposition 4: The pharmaceutical supply chain can be coordinated by linkage price 
cap regulation when ?̅? =
𝜶+𝜷𝒄
𝟐𝜷
 and 
𝜶+𝟑𝒄𝜷
𝟐(𝜶+𝒄𝜷)
< 𝜃 <
𝟑𝜶+𝟓𝒄𝜷
𝟒(𝜶+𝒄𝜷)
. 
This proposition indicates that the government can design an optimal retail price cap and 
linkage coefficient to coordinate the pharmaceutical supply chain. An optimally designed 
linkage price cap regulation is an effective regulation strategy for increasing social welfare, 
improving the economic performance of the pharmacy and pharmaceutical manufacturer, and 
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coordinating the pharmaceutical supply chain. 
 
6 Conclusions and suggestions for future research 
In this paper, we investigate a two-echelon pharmaceutical supply chain composed of one 
pharmaceutical manufacturer and one pharmacy. Using the Stackelberg game, we derive the 
optimal pricing decisions under no price cap regulation, retailer price cap regulation, 
manufacturer price cap regulation and linkage price cap regulation. Then, we analyze the effect 
of each price cap regulation on the optimal prices and profits, the patient surplus and social 
welfare. The main results are as follows.  
• Under each price cap regulation, the situation always exists where the price cap 
regulation has no effect on the pricing decisions and social welfare, that is, if the price caps are 
high (?̅? ≥ 𝑝𝑛 or ?̅? ≥ 𝑤𝑛). Conversely, setting a lower price cap will always reduce the retail 
prices of drugs and improve the patient surplus and social welfare. Therefore, an effective price 
cap regulation that prevents pharmaceutical firms from making excessive profits and ensures 
social welfare requires policy makers to set more restricted price caps.     
• However, restricted price caps also have an adverse effect. For instance, our analysis of 
pharmaceutical firms’ financial performance proves that one-sided price cap regulations, e.g., 
retailer price cap regulation and manufacturer price cap regulation, will certainly economically 
harm the regulated firm, whereas the unregulated firm may gain a financial advantage. There is 
the risk of a policy failure that results in a drug supply shortage if pharmaceutical firms cannot 
cope with the financial loss brought by the price cap regulation. To mitigate the risk of policy 
failure, policy makers may consider providing subsidies to the regulated firm to compensate for 
the loss caused by price cap regulations. For the pharmaceutical firms that benefit from 
regulations (the unregulated firms), one should consider supply chain coordination mechanisms, 
e.g., a revenue-sharing contract or quantity discount contract to redistribute the increased profits 
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with their supply chain partners, since the supply stoppage of associated pharmaceutical goods 
will have a knock-on effect on their performance.   
• Our analysis also demonstrates that linkage price cap regulation can be an effective 
regulatory policy that improves both the economic and social performance of the 
pharmaceutical supply chain. We also design an optimal region of the retail price cap ?̅? and the 
linkage coefficient 𝜃 to enable both the pharmacy and pharmaceutical manufacturer to achieve 
Pareto improvement. Policy makers can set the retail price cap and wholesale price cap 
simultaneously according to the linkage regulation mechanism designed in this paper. In this 
case, the pharmaceutical firms and patients can achieve a win-win outcome. Moreover, we also 
provide the optimal retail price cap and linkage coefficient to coordinate the pharmaceutical 
supply chain. In this way, an optimally designed linkage price cap regulation can succeed in 
mitigating the risk of a policy failure and achieving social and economic objectives 
simultaneously.  
Since the pharmaceutical industry plays an important role in the healthcare system, many 
countries in the world, e.g., Germany, Norway, Austria, and China, have imposed policies to 
regulate this particular industry. Price cap regulation is one of the commonly used regulation 
policies to reduce drug prices and protect patients (Pavanik, 2002; Godman et al., 2008; Puig-
Junoy, 2010). However, price cap regulations may also cause risks to the pharmaceutical supply 
chain because of the negative economic impact on the regulated pharmaceutical firms. Hence, 
how to design the price cap regulation and how to manage the risk associated with the policy 
implementation are crucial and emergent problems for governments and the pharmaceutical 
sector. Our research proposes a novel approach of evaluating alternative price cap regulations 
by modeling pharmaceutical firms’ decision behavior as well as the consequential economic 
and social performance. This approach enables policy makers to effectively examine the effect 
of price cap regulations and assess the risks associated with different regulatory settings. The 
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results shed some light for policy makers on developing an optimal regulatory policy that not 
only improves the social welfare of the general public but also protects the essential economic 
benefits of pharmaceutical firms and therefore improves the sustainability of the pharmaceutical 
sector.  
Similar to the existing studies in the literature, our work has some limitations that can lead 
to several extensions in the future. First, our model discusses the supply chain setting of only 
one pharmaceutical manufacturer and one pharmacy using linear deterministic demand. One 
important extension is to consider stochastic demand (Shi et al., 2013; Chen and Wang, 2016) 
and conduct an investigation with multiple manufacturers and multiple pharmacies (Sana et al., 
2014; Wang and Chen, 2017). Second, we consider the pharmaceutical manufacturer as the 
Stackelberg leader. A future investigation can consider the pharmacy Stackelberg structure and 
the Nash structure (Shi et al., 2013; Chen and Wang, 2015). Different power structures may 
generate some interesting insights about the effect of price cap regulations. Third, our research 
considers only price cap regulations. Since other regulatory policies (e.g., quality regulation) 
have also been widely adopted, one future extension is to consider other regulations and 
examine their impacts on the economic and social performances of the pharmaceutical supply 
chain.  
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Appendix 
Proof of Table 2 
NPCR model 
From formula (2), we obtain  
𝑑𝜋𝑟(𝑝)
𝑑𝑝
= 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝 − 𝛽(𝑝 − 𝑤) and 
𝑑2𝜋𝑟(𝑝)
𝑑𝑝2
= −2𝛽 < 0, so 𝜋𝑟(𝑝) is concave in 
𝑝 . From 
𝑑𝜋𝑟(𝑝)
𝑑𝑝
= 0, we get 𝑝𝑛 =
𝛼+𝛽𝑤
2𝛽
. Replace 𝑝𝑛  in formula (1), and obtain 
𝑑𝜋𝑚(𝑤)
𝑑𝑤
=
𝛼+𝛽𝑐−2𝛽𝑤
2
 and 
𝑑2𝜋𝑚(𝑤)
𝑑𝑤2
= −𝛽 < 0, so 𝜋𝑚(𝑤) is concave in 𝑤. Let 
𝑑𝜋𝑚(𝑤)
𝑑𝑤
= 0; we obtain 𝑤𝑛 =
𝛼+𝛽𝑐
2𝛽
, then 𝑝𝑛 =
3𝛼+𝛽𝑐
4𝛽
.  
RPCR model 
First, for the pharmacy, we solve 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑝
𝜋𝑟(𝑝) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑝
(𝑝 − 𝑤)(𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝) subject to  𝑝 ≤ ?̅?.  
i) If ?̅? ≥ 𝑝𝑛, then the regulation does not work, so the optimal prices are 𝑝𝑟 = 𝑝𝑛 and 𝑤𝑟 = 𝑤𝑛. 
ii) If ?̅? < 𝑝𝑛, then the regulation works, so the pharmacy’s optimal retail price is 𝑝𝑟 = ?̅?. Second, for the 
manufacturer, replace 𝑝𝑟 = ?̅? in formula (1). Then, we should solve 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑤
𝜋𝑚(𝑤) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑤
(𝑤 − 𝑐)(𝛼 − 𝛽?̅?). 
Since 𝜋𝑚(𝑤) increases in 𝑤 and 𝑐 < 𝑤 < 𝑝
𝑟 = ?̅?, the optimal wholesale price is 𝑤𝑟 = ?̅?. 
In summary, (1) if ?̅? ≥ 𝑝𝑛, then 𝑝𝑟 = 𝑝𝑛 and 𝑤𝑟 = 𝑤𝑛; (2) if ?̅? < 𝑝𝑛, then 𝑝𝑟 = ?̅? and 𝑤𝑟 = ?̅?.  
MPCR model 
First for the pharmacy, from the proof of the NPCR model, the response function is 𝑝𝑚 =
𝛼+𝛽𝑤
2𝛽
. Then, 
replace 𝑝𝑚 in formula (1); we should solve 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑤
𝜋𝑚(𝑤) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑤
(𝑤 − 𝑐) (𝛼 − 𝛽
𝛼+𝑤𝛽
2𝛽
) subject to 𝑤 ≤ ?̅?.  
i) If ?̅? ≥ 𝑤𝑛, then the regulation does not work, so the optimal prices are 𝑝𝑚 = 𝑝𝑛 and 𝑤𝑚 = 𝑤𝑛. 
ii) If ?̅? < 𝑤𝑛, then the regulation works, so the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price is 𝑤𝑚 = ?̅?. Then, 
the pharmacy’s optimal retail price is 𝑝𝑚 =
𝛼+𝛽𝑤𝑚
2𝛽
=
𝛼+𝛽?̅?
2𝛽
. 
LPCR model 
(1) If ?̅? ≥ 𝑝𝑛  and ?̅? ≥ 𝑤𝑛 , then the linkage regulation has no effect on either the pharmacy or the 
manufacturer, so the optimal prices are 𝑝𝑠 = 𝑝𝑛 and 𝑤𝑠 = 𝑤𝑛. 
(2) If ?̅? ≥ 𝑝𝑛 and ?̅? < 𝑤𝑛, then the linkage regulation has an effect only on the manufacturer. Then, from 
ii) of the proof of the MPCR model, we obtain 𝑝𝑠 =
𝛼+𝛽𝜃?̅?
2𝛽
 and 𝑤𝑠 = 𝜃?̅?. 
(3) If ?̅? < 𝑝𝑛 and ?̅? ≥ 𝑤𝑛, then the linkage regulation has an effect only on the pharmacy. Then, from ii) of 
the proof of the RPCR model, we obtain 𝑝𝑠 = ?̅? and 𝑤𝑠 = ?̅?. 
(4) If ?̅? < 𝑝𝑛  and ?̅? < 𝑤𝑛 , then the linkage regulation has an effect on both the pharmacy and the 
manufacturer. First, for the pharmacy, the optimal retail price is 𝑝𝑠 = ?̅?. Replace it in formula (1), and we 
should solve 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑤
𝜋𝑚(𝑤) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑤
(𝑤 − 𝑐)(𝛼 − 𝛽?̅?)  subject to 𝑤 ≤ 𝜃?̅? . Since 𝜋𝑚(𝑤) increases in 𝑤  and 
𝑐 < 𝑤 ≤ 𝜃?̅?, the optimal wholesale price is 𝑤𝑠 = 𝜃?̅?. 
 
Proof of Lemma 1 
(1) From Table 2, if ?̅? ≥ 𝑝𝑛, then 𝑝𝑟 = 𝑝𝑛 and 𝑤𝑟 = 𝑤𝑛. If ?̅? < 𝑝𝑛, then 𝑝𝑟 − 𝑝𝑛 = ?̅? − 𝑝𝑛 < 0, so 𝑝𝑟 <
𝑝𝑛. In addition, 𝑤𝑟 − 𝑤𝑛 = ?̅? − 𝑤𝑛. If ?̅? < 𝑤𝑛, then 𝑤𝑟 < 𝑤𝑛; if 𝑤𝑛 < ?̅? < 𝑝𝑛, then 𝑤𝑟 > 𝑤𝑛. 
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(2) If ?̅? ≥ 𝑝𝑛 , then 𝑊𝑠
𝑟 =
7(𝛼−𝑐𝛽)2
32𝛽
 and 𝐶𝑠
𝑟 =
(𝛼−𝑐𝛽)2
32𝛽
; both are independent on ?̅?. If ?̅? < 𝑝𝑛 , then 𝑊𝑠
𝑟 =
(𝛼−𝛽?̅?)(𝛼−2𝑐𝛽+𝛽?̅?)
2𝛽
 and 
𝑑𝑊𝑠
𝑟
𝑑𝑝
_ = 𝛽(𝑐 − ?̅?) < 0; 𝐶𝑠
𝑟 =
(𝛼−?̅?𝛽)2
2𝛽
 and 
𝑑𝐶𝑠
𝑟
𝑑𝑝
_ = −𝛼 + ?̅?𝛽 < 0. Therefore, 𝑊𝑠
𝑟  and 𝐶𝑠
𝑟 
decrease in ?̅?. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
From Table 2 and formula (2), we obtain 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑟) − 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑛) = 0 −
(𝛼−𝑐𝛽)2
16𝛽
< 0, and 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑟) < 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑛). From 
Table 2 and formula (1), we obtain 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑟) − 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑛) = (?̅? − 𝑐)(𝛼 − 𝛽?̅?) −
(𝛼−𝑐𝛽)2
8𝛽
. Then, 
𝑑[𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑟)−𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑛)]
𝑑?̅?
= 𝛼 + 𝑐𝛽 − 2𝛽?̅?  and 
𝑑2[𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑟)−𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑛)]
𝑑?̅?2
= −2𝛽 < 0 ; hence, 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑟) − 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑛)  is 
concave in ?̅?. The roots of 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑟) − 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑛) are ?̅?0 =
𝛼+𝑐𝛽
2𝛽
−
√2(𝛼−𝑐𝛽)
4𝛽
 and ?̅?1 =
𝛼+𝑐𝛽
2𝛽
+
√2(𝛼−𝑐𝛽)
4𝛽
. Since 
𝑐 < ?̅? <
3𝛼+𝑐𝛽
4𝛽
, ?̅?1 should be rejected. Further, if ?̅? <
𝛼+𝑐𝛽
2𝛽
−
√2(𝛼−𝑐𝛽)
4𝛽
, we obtain 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑟) − 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑛) < 0, 
so 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑟) < 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑛) ; if ?̅? >
𝛼+𝑐𝛽
2𝛽
−
√2(𝛼−𝑐𝛽)
4𝛽
, we obtain 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑟) − 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑛) > 0 , so 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑟) >
𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑛).  
 
Proof of Lemma 2 
(1) From Table 2, if ?̅? ≥ 𝑤𝑛, then 𝑝𝑚 = 𝑝𝑛  and 𝑤𝑚 = 𝑤𝑛. If ?̅? < 𝑤𝑛, then 𝑝𝑚 − 𝑝𝑛 = −
𝛼+𝑐𝛽−2𝛽?̅?
4𝛽
<
−
𝛼+𝑐𝛽−2𝛽𝑤𝑛
4𝛽
= 0, so 𝑝𝑚 < 𝑝𝑛. In addition, 𝑤𝑚 − 𝑤𝑛 = ?̅? −
𝛼+𝑐𝛽
2𝛽
< 0, and 𝑤𝑚 < 𝑤𝑛. 
(2) If ?̅? ≥ 𝑤𝑛, we obtain 𝑊𝑠
𝑚 =
7(𝛼−𝑐𝛽)2
32𝛽
 and 𝐶𝑠
𝑚 =
(𝛼−𝑐𝛽)2
32𝛽
; both are independent on ?̅?. If ?̅? < 𝑤𝑛, we 
obtain 𝑊𝑠
𝑚 =
(𝛼−𝛽?̅?)(3𝛼−4𝑐𝛽+𝛽?̅?)
8𝛽
 and 
𝑑𝑊𝑠
𝑚
𝑑𝑝
_ =
1
4
(−𝛼 + 2𝑐𝛽 − 𝛽?̅?) <
1
4
(−𝛼 + 2𝑐𝛽 − 𝛽𝑐) =
1
4
(−𝛼 +
𝑐𝛽) < 0. 𝐶𝑠
𝑚 =
(𝛼−𝛽?̅?)2
8𝛽
 and 
𝑑𝐶𝑠
𝑚
𝑑𝑝
_ = −𝛼 + 𝛽?̅? < 0. So 𝑊𝑠
𝑚 and 𝐶𝑠
𝑚 decrease in ?̅?. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
From Table 2 and formula (2), we obtain 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑚) − 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑛) =
(3𝛼−𝑐𝛽−2𝛽?̅?)(𝛼+𝑐𝛽−2𝛽?̅?)
16𝛽
. Since ?̅? < 𝑤𝑛 , 
3𝛼 − 𝑐𝛽 − 2𝛽?̅? > 3𝛼 − 𝑐𝛽 − 2𝛽
𝛼+𝑐𝛽
2𝛽
= 2(𝛼 − 𝑐𝛽) > 0 . Therefore, 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑚) − 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑛) > 0  and 
𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑚) > 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑛). From Table 2 and formula (1), we obtain  𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑚) − 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑛) = −
(𝛼+𝑐𝛽−2𝛽?̅?)2
8𝛽
< 0, so 
𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑚) < 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑛).  
 
Proof of Lemma 3 
(1) From Table 2, 1) if ?̅? ≥ 𝑝𝑛 and ?̅? ≥ 𝑤𝑛, then 𝑝𝑠 = 𝑝𝑛 and 𝑤𝑠 = 𝑤𝑛.  
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2) If ?̅? ≥ 𝑝𝑛  and ?̅? < 𝑤𝑛 , then 𝑝𝑠 =
𝛼+𝛽𝜃?̅?
2𝛽
 and 𝑤𝑠 = 𝜃?̅? . Therefore, 𝑝𝑠 − 𝑝𝑛 = −
𝛼+𝑐𝛽−2𝛽𝜃?̅?
4𝛽
<
−
𝛼+𝑐𝛽−2𝛽𝑤𝑛
4𝛽
= 0, 𝑝𝑠 < 𝑝𝑛; 𝑤𝑠 − 𝑤𝑛 = 𝜃?̅? −
𝛼+𝛽𝑐
2𝛽
= ?̅? −
𝛼+𝛽𝑐
2𝛽
< 0, and 𝑤𝑠 < 𝑤𝑛. 
3) If ?̅? < 𝑝𝑛 and ?̅? ≥ 𝑤𝑛, then 𝑝𝑠 = ?̅? and 𝑤𝑠 = ?̅?. Therefore, 𝑝𝑠 < 𝑝𝑛; 𝑤𝑠 − 𝑤𝑛 = ?̅? − 𝑤𝑛 =
?̅?
𝜃
− 𝑤𝑛 >
0, and 𝑤𝑠 > 𝑤𝑛. 
4) If ?̅? < 𝑝𝑛 and ?̅? < 𝑤𝑛, then 𝑝𝑠 = ?̅? and 𝑤𝑠 = 𝜃?̅?. Therefore, 𝑝𝑠 < 𝑝𝑛; 𝑤𝑠 − 𝑤𝑛 = 𝜃?̅? −
𝛼+𝛽𝑐
2𝛽
< 0, and 
𝑤𝑠 < 𝑤𝑛. 
In summary, we obtain that if ?̅? ≥ 𝑝𝑛 and ?̅? ≥ 𝑤𝑛, then 𝑝𝑠 = 𝑝𝑛 and 𝑤𝑠 = 𝑤𝑛. If ?̅? < 𝑝𝑛 and ?̅? ≥ 𝑤𝑛, 
then 𝑝𝑠 < 𝑝𝑛 and 𝑤𝑠 > 𝑤𝑛. If ?̅? < 𝑤𝑛, then 𝑝𝑠 < 𝑝𝑛 and 𝑤𝑠 < 𝑤𝑛. 
(2) If ?̅? ≥ 𝑝𝑛 and ?̅? ≥ 𝑤𝑛, then 𝑊𝑠
𝑠 =
7(𝛼−𝑐𝛽)2
32𝛽
 and 𝐶𝑠
𝑠 =
(𝛼−𝑐𝛽)2
32𝛽
. Therefore, 𝑊𝑠
𝑠 and 𝐶𝑠
𝑠 are independent 
on ?̅?. 
If ?̅? ≥ 𝑝𝑛  and ?̅? < 𝑤𝑛 , then 𝑊𝑠
𝑠 =
(𝛼−𝛽𝜃?̅?)(3𝛼−4𝑐𝛽+𝛽𝜃?̅?)
8𝛽
 and 
𝑑𝑊𝑠
𝑠
𝑑?̅?
= −
1
4
𝜃(𝛼 − 2𝑐𝛽 + 𝛽𝜃?̅?) < −
1
4
𝜃(𝛼 −
2𝑐𝛽 + 𝛽𝑐) = −
1
4
𝜃(𝛼 − 𝑐𝛽) < 0 ; 𝐶𝑠
𝑠 =
(𝛼−𝛽𝜃?̅?)2
8𝛽
 and 
𝑑𝐶𝑠
𝑠
𝑑?̅?
=
1
4
𝜃(−𝛼 + 𝛽𝜃?̅?) < 0 . Therefore, 𝑊𝑠
𝑠  and 𝐶𝑠
𝑠 
decrease in ?̅?. 
If ?̅? < 𝑝𝑛 and ?̅? ≥ 𝑤𝑛, or if ?̅? < 𝑝𝑛 and ?̅? < 𝑤𝑛, then 𝑊𝑠
𝑠 =
(𝛼−𝛽?̅?)(𝛼−2𝑐𝛽+𝛽?̅?)
2𝛽
 and 
𝑑𝑊𝑠
𝑠
𝑑?̅?
= 𝛽(𝑐 − ?̅?) < 0; 
𝐶𝑠
𝑠 =
(𝛼−?̅?𝛽)2
2𝛽
 and 
𝑑𝐶𝑠
𝑠
𝑑?̅?
= −𝛼 + ?̅?𝛽 < 0. Therefore, 𝑊𝑠
𝑠 and 𝐶𝑠
𝑠 decrease in ?̅?. 
Hence, if ?̅? ≥ 𝑝𝑛 and ?̅? ≥ 𝑤𝑛, then 𝑊𝑠
𝑠 and 𝐶𝑠
𝑠 are independent on ?̅?. Otherwise, 𝑊𝑠
𝑠 and 𝐶𝑠
𝑠 decrease in ?̅?. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
(1) From Table 2, if ?̅? ≥ 𝑝𝑛  and ?̅? ≥ 𝑤𝑛, then 𝑝𝑠 = 𝑝𝑛  and 𝑤𝑠 = 𝑤𝑛. Therefore, 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑠) = 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑛) and 
𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑠) = 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑛). In this case, Pareto improvement cannot be achieved. 
(2) If ?̅? ≥ 𝑝𝑛  and ?̅? < 𝑤𝑛 , then 𝑝𝑠 =
𝛼+𝛽𝜃?̅?
2𝛽
 and 𝑤𝑠 = 𝜃?̅? . So 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑠) − 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑛) =
1
2
(𝜃?̅? − 𝑐)(𝛼 −
𝜃𝛽?̅?) −
(𝛼−𝑐𝛽)2
8𝛽
= −
(𝛼+𝑐𝛽−2𝜃𝛽?̅?)2
8𝛽
< 0. In this case, Pareto improvement cannot be achieved. 
(3) If ?̅? < 𝑝𝑛 and ?̅? ≥ 𝑤𝑛, then 𝑝𝑠 = ?̅? and 𝑤𝑠 = ?̅?. Therefore, 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑠) = 0 and 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑠) < 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑛). In this 
case, Pareto improvement cannot be achieved. 
(4) If ?̅? < 𝑝𝑛 and ?̅? < 𝑤𝑛, then 𝑝𝑠 = ?̅? and 𝑤𝑠 = 𝜃?̅?. To ensure that the marginal profits and demand are 
positive, we obtain 𝜃 >
𝑐
?̅?
.  
From Tables 1 and 2, we obtain 𝜋𝑠
𝑠 − 𝜋𝑠
𝑛 = −
(3𝛼+𝑐𝛽−4𝛽?̅?)(𝛼+3𝑐𝛽−4𝛽?̅?)
16𝛽
. Since ?̅? < 𝑝𝑛 =
3𝛼+𝑐𝛽
4𝛽
, 3𝛼 + 𝑐𝛽 −
4𝛽?̅? > 3𝛼 + 𝑐𝛽 − 4𝛽
3𝛼+𝑐𝛽
4𝛽
= 0. To discuss the Pareto zone, 𝜋𝑠
𝑠 > 𝜋𝑠
𝑛  must be satisfied. So 𝛼 + 3𝑐𝛽 −
4𝛽?̅? < 0 must be satisfied, and ?̅? >
𝛼+3𝑐𝛽
4𝛽
. Next, we will discuss the pharmacy’s and the manufacturer’s 
profits under the conditions 
𝛼+3𝑐𝛽
4𝛽
< ?̅? < 𝑝𝑛 =
3𝛼+𝑐𝛽
4𝛽
 and 𝜃?̅? < 𝑤𝑛. 
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1) For the pharmacy, 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑠) − 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑛) = (1 − 𝜃)?̅?(𝛼 − 𝛽?̅?) −
(𝛼−𝑐𝛽)2
16𝛽
 and it decreases in 𝜃. We can get one 
root 𝜃0 =
16𝛽?̅?(𝛼−𝛽?̅?)−(𝛼−𝑐𝛽)2
16𝛽?̅?(𝛼−𝛽?̅?)
. Since 𝜃?̅? < 𝑤𝑛 and 
𝑐
?̅?
< 𝜃 < 1, 
𝑐
?̅?
< 𝜃 < 𝑚𝑖𝑛 {
𝑤𝑛
?̅?
, 1}. Therefore, we should 
compare 𝜃0 with these thresholds. First, it is easy to obtain 𝜃0 < 1. Then, compare 𝜃0 with 
𝑤𝑛
?̅?
; we get 𝜃0 −
𝑤𝑛
?̅?
= −
(3𝛼+𝑐𝛽−4𝛽?̅?)2
16𝛽?̅?(𝛼−𝛽?̅?)
< 0 , so 𝜃0 <
𝑤𝑛
?̅?
. Finally, compare 𝜃0  with 
𝑐
?̅?
, we get 𝜃0 −
𝑐
?̅?
=
−16𝛽2?̅?2+16𝛽(𝛼+𝑐𝛽)?̅?−(𝛼−𝑐𝛽)2−16𝛼𝛽𝑐
16𝛽?̅?(𝛼−𝛽?̅?)
. Let 𝐹(?̅?) = −16𝛽2?̅?2 + 16𝛽(𝛼 + 𝑐𝛽)?̅? − (𝛼 − 𝑐𝛽)2 − 16𝛼𝛽𝑐. Then, 
𝐹(?̅?)  is concave in ?̅? . Since 
𝛼+3𝑐𝛽
4𝛽
< ?̅? <
3𝛼+𝑐𝛽
4𝛽
, 𝐹(?̅?)|
?̅?=
𝛼+3𝑐𝛽
4𝛽
= 2(𝛼 − 𝑐𝛽)2 > 0  and 𝐹(?̅?)|
?̅?=
3𝛼+𝑐𝛽
4𝛽
=
2(𝛼 − 𝑐𝛽)2 > 0. Then, we can conclude 𝐹(?̅?) > 0, so 𝜃0 >
𝑐
?̅?
.  
From above analysis, we obtain if 
𝛼+3𝑐𝛽
4𝛽
< ?̅? <
3𝛼+𝑐𝛽
4𝛽
 and 
𝑐
?̅?
< 𝜃 < 𝜃0, then 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑠) > 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑛). 
2) For the manufacturer, 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑠) − 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑛) = (𝜃?̅? − 𝑐)(𝛼 − 𝛽?̅?) −
(𝛼−𝑐𝛽)2
8𝛽
 and it increases in 𝜃. We can 
obtain the root 𝜃1 =
𝛼2+6𝑐𝛼𝛽+𝑐2𝛽2−8𝑐𝛽2𝑝
_
8𝛽?̅?(𝛼−𝛽?̅?)
. First, we compare 𝜃1 with 
𝑐
?̅?
, and 𝜃1 −
𝑐
?̅?
=
(𝛼−𝑐𝛽)2
8𝛽?̅?(𝛼−𝛽?̅?)
> 0. Second, 
from 1), when ?̅? > 𝑤𝑛 =
𝛼+𝛽𝑐
2𝛽
, 
𝑤𝑛
?̅?
< 1, so 𝜃 <
𝑤𝑛
?̅?
 and 𝜃1 −
𝑤𝑛
?̅?
=
(𝛼−𝑐𝛽)(?̅?−𝑝𝑛)
2?̅?(𝛼−𝛽?̅?)
< 0. That means that when 
𝛼+𝛽𝑐
2𝛽
< ?̅? <
3𝛼+𝑐𝛽
4𝛽
 and 𝜃1 < 𝜃 <
𝑤𝑛
?̅?
, 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑠) > 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑛). When ?̅? < 𝑤𝑛 =
𝛼+𝛽𝑐
2𝛽
, 
𝑤𝑛
?̅?
> 1, so 𝜃 < 1 and 
𝜃1 − 1 =
8𝛽2?̅?2−8𝛽(𝛼+𝑐𝛽)?̅?+𝛼2+6𝑐𝛼𝛽+𝑐2𝛽2
8𝛽?̅?(𝛼−𝛽?̅?)
. Let 𝐺(?̅?) = 8𝛽2?̅?2 − 8𝛽(𝛼 + 𝑐𝛽)?̅? + 𝛼2 + 6𝑐𝛼𝛽 + 𝑐2𝛽2. Then, 
𝐺(?̅?)  is convex in ?̅? . Since 
𝛼+3𝑐𝛽
4𝛽
< ?̅? <
𝛼+𝛽𝑐
2𝛽
, 𝐺(?̅?)|
?̅?=
𝛼+3𝑐𝛽
4𝛽
= −
1
2
(𝛼 − 𝑐𝛽)2 < 0  and 𝐺(?̅?)|
?̅?=
𝛼+𝛽𝑐
2𝛽
=
−(𝛼 − 𝑐𝛽)2 < 0. Hence, we can conclude that 𝐺(?̅?) < 0 and 𝜃1 < 1. That means that when 
𝛼+3𝑐𝛽
4𝛽
< ?̅? <
𝛼+𝛽𝑐
2𝛽
 and 𝜃1 < 𝜃 < 1, we obtain 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑠) > 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑛). 
From above analysis, we obtain that if 
𝛼+3𝑐𝛽
4𝛽
< ?̅? <
𝛼+𝛽𝑐
2𝛽
 and 𝜃1 < 𝜃 < 1, or 
𝛼+𝛽𝑐
2𝛽
< ?̅? <
3𝛼+𝑐𝛽
4𝛽
 and 𝜃1 <
𝜃 <
𝑤𝑛
?̅?
, then 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑠) > 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑛). 
From 1) and 2), we should take the intersections. Since 𝜃0 − 𝜃1 =
𝛽(
3𝛼+𝑐𝛽
4𝛽
−?̅?)(?̅?−
𝛼+3𝑐𝛽
4𝛽
)
?̅?(𝛼−𝛽?̅?)
> 0, if 
𝛼+3𝑐𝛽
4𝛽
< ?̅? <
3𝛼+𝑐𝛽
4𝛽
 and 𝜃1 < 𝜃 < 𝜃0 , we obtain 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑠) > 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑛)  and 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑠) > 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑛) , where 𝜃0 =
16𝛽?̅?(𝛼−𝛽?̅?)−(𝛼−𝑐𝛽)2
16𝛽?̅?(𝛼−𝛽?̅?)
 and 𝜃1 =
𝛼2+6𝑐𝛼𝛽+𝑐2𝛽2−8𝑐𝛽2?̅?
8𝛽?̅?(𝛼−𝛽?̅?)
. 
 
Proof of Lemma 4 
From Table 1, we obtain  
𝜕𝜋𝑠
𝜕𝑝
= 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝 − 𝛽(𝑝 − 𝑐) and 
𝜕2𝜋𝑠
𝜕𝑝2
= −2𝛽 < 0. Therefore, 𝜋𝑠 is concave in 𝑝. Let 
𝜕𝜋𝑠
𝜕𝑝
= 0; we obtain  𝑝𝐼 =
𝛼+𝛽𝑐
2𝛽
. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
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From Proposition 3, if 
𝛼+3𝑐𝛽
4𝛽
< ?̅? <
3𝛼+𝑐𝛽
4𝛽
 and 𝜃1 < 𝜃 < 𝜃0, both the pharmacy and the manufacturer can 
achieve Pareto improvement. Therefore, it is meaningful to discuss the supply chain coordination under this 
case.  
First, for the pharmacy, we should solve 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑝
𝜋𝑟(𝑝) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑝
(𝑝 − 𝑤)(𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝) subject to 𝑝 ≤ ?̅?. Recall the 
proof for the LPCR model: when ?̅? < 𝑝𝑛 =
3𝛼+𝑐𝛽
4𝛽
, then 𝑝𝑠 = ?̅?. To coordinate the supply chain, 𝑝𝑠 = 𝑝𝐼 =
𝛼+𝛽𝑐
2𝛽
 must be satisfied, so ?̅? =
𝛼+𝛽𝑐
2𝛽
.  
Second, for the manufacturer, we should solve 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑤
𝜋𝑚(𝑤) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑤
(𝑤 − 𝑐)(𝛼 − 𝛽?̅?) subject to 𝑤 ≤ 𝜃?̅?. 
Recall the proof for the LPCR model,  
i) If ?̅? ≥ 𝑤𝑛 =
𝛼+𝛽𝑐
2𝛽
, then the regulation has no effect on the manufacturer, and we get 𝑤𝑠 = ?̅? =
𝛼+𝛽𝑐
2𝛽
. 
However, in this case, 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑠) < 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑛), so the supply chain cannot be coordinated. 
ii) If ?̅? < 𝑤𝑛 =
𝛼+𝛽𝑐
2𝛽
, then 𝑤𝑠 = 𝜃?̅? =
𝜃(𝛼+𝛽𝑐)
2𝛽
. Moreover, to coordinate the supply chain, 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑠) > 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑛) 
and 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑠) > 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑛)  must be satisfied. 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑠) − 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑛) =
−(𝛼−𝛽𝑐)[4(𝛼+𝛽𝑐)𝜃−(3𝛼+5𝛽𝑐)]
16𝛽
> 0 , and 𝜃 <
3𝛼+5𝑐𝛽
4(𝛼+𝑐𝛽)
. In addition, 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑠) − 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑛) =
(𝛼−𝑐𝛽)[2(𝛼+𝛽𝑐)𝜃−(𝛼+3𝛽𝑐)]
8𝛽
> 0, and 𝜃 >
𝛼+3𝑐𝛽
2(𝛼+𝑐𝛽)
. Hence, when 
?̅? =
𝛼+𝑐𝛽
2𝛽
 and 
𝛼+3𝑐𝛽
2(𝛼+𝑐𝛽)
< 𝜃 <
3𝛼+5𝑐𝛽
4(𝛼+𝑐𝛽)
, the supply chain can be coordinated. 
